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Abstract	
How	do	men	respond	to	feminist	movements	and	to	shifts	in	the	gender	order?		In	this	paper,	
I	introduce	the	concept	of	historical	gender	formation	to	show	how	shifting	social	conditions	
over	the	past	forty	years	shaped	a	range	of	men’s	organized	responses	to	feminism.	Focusing	
on	 the	 US,	 I	 show	 how	 progressive	men	 reacted	 to	 feminism	 in	 the	 1970s	 by	 forming	 an	
internally	 contradictory	 ‘men’s	 liberation’	 movement	 that	 soon	 split	 into	 opposing	 anti‐
feminist	and	pro‐feminist	factions.	Three	large	transformations	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	–	the	
professional	institutionalization	of	feminism,	the	rise	of	a	postfeminist	sensibility,	and	shifts	
in	the	political	economy	(especially	deindustrialization	and	the	rise	of	the	neoliberal	state)	–	
generated	 new	 possibilities.	 I	 end	 by	 pointing	 to	 an	 emergent	 moderate	 men’s	 rights	
discourse	 that	appeals	 to	a	postfeminist	 sensibility,	 and	 to	an	 increasingly	diverse	base	 for	
men’s	work	to	prevent	violence	against	women.	
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Introduction	
For	more	than	a	century,	men	in	have	responded	to	feminist	movements	in	the	US	and	in	other	
western	 jurisdictions	 in	 varying	ways,	 ranging	 from	outright	 hostility,	 to	 sarcastic	 ridicule,	 to	
indifference,	 to	grudging	sympathy,	 to	enthusiastic	 support	 (Kimmel	1987;	Messner	1997).	 In	
this	article	I	argue	that	large‐scale	social	changes	–	those	shaped	by	social	movements,	changing	
cultural	beliefs,	and	shifts	in	political	economy	–	create	moments	of	historical	gender	formation	
that	in	turn	shape,	constrain	and	enable	certain	forms	of	men’s	gender	politics.	In	particular,	 I	
trace	 the	 two	most	 politically	 engaged	 tails	 of	 a	 continuum	 of	 gender	 politics	 –	 anti‐feminist	
men’s	rights	groups	and	pro‐feminist	men	allies	–	with	an	eye	to	understanding	how	moments	
of	historical	gender	 formation	shape	men’s	gender	politics.	First,	 I	draw	from	an	earlier	study	
that	 outlined	 the	 context	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 opposing	 US	men’s	 movements	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	
1980s	(Messner	1997),	reiterating	parts	of	that	analysis	that	are	relevant	to	thinking	about	the	
concurrent	 and	 mutually	 antagonistic	 rise	 of	 men’s	 anti‐feminism	 and	 men’s	 pro‐feminism.	
Second,	I	draw	from	a	recent	study	of	men	anti‐rape	and	anti‐domestic	violence	activists	in	the	
US,	 to	 illuminate	 men’s	 current	 engagements	 with	 feminism	 and	 gender	 politics	 (Messner,	
Greenberg	and	Peretz	2015).	
	
The	1970s	and	 the	present	moment	generated	possibilities	 for	men’s	gender	politics:	 forks	 in	
the	 road,	 as	 it	 were.	 The	 image	 of	 historical	 forks	 in	 the	 road	 implies	 choices	 for	 men’s	
responses	to	feminism,	but	not	an	unlimited	range	of	‘free’	choices.	Rather,	feminist	challenges	
and	shifts	in	the	gender	order	confront	men	with	a	limited	field	of	structured	options:		stop	dead	
in	 your	 tracks,	 befuddled;	 attempt	 a	 U‐turn	 and	 retreat	 toward	 an	 idealized	 past	 of	 male	
entitlement;	turn	right	and	join	a	backlash	against	feminism;	or	bend	left	and	actively	support	
feminism.	 Adapted	 from	 Omi	 and	 Winant’s	 (1986)	 theory	 of	 racial	 formation,	 I	 introduce	
historical	gender	 formation,	 a	 concept	 that	provides	 a	more	nuanced	view	of	 the	dynamics	 of	
gender	 politics	 than	 the	 dualistic	 image	 of	 a	 fork	 in	 the	 road.	 Central	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 racial	
formation	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 grassroots	 racial	 justice	movements	 of	 the	 1950s	 through	 the	
1970s	 wrested	 concessions	 from	 the	 state,	 altered	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 racial	 categories	 were	
defined,	and	created	new	foundations	upon	which	subsequent	racial	tensions	and	politics	arose.	
Similarly,	the	women’s	movements	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	wrested	concessions	from	the	state,	
challenged	 and	partially	 transformed	 cultural	 values	 about	 sex	 and	 gender,	 and	 succeeded	 in	
bringing	about	substantial	reforms	in	various	social	institutions.	Thus,	men’s	engagements	with	
gender	 politics	 today	 take	 place	 in	 a	 very	 different	 context	 –	 one	 partly	 transformed	 by	
feminism	–	than	they	did	 in	 the	1970s.	 I	will	demonstrate	that	 the	1970s	and	the	present	are	
two	 moments	 of	 gender	 formation	 that	 create	 different	 limits	 and	 possibilities	 for	 men’s	
engagements,	both	for	and	against	feminism.	
	
1970s	gender	formation:	The	women’s	movement	and	men’s	liberation	
By	 the	 early	 1970’s,	 following	 several	 years	 of	 organizing,	 the	women’s	 liberation	movement	
had	exploded	on	to	the	social	scene.	In	the	United	States,	the	most	visible	feminist	activism	took	
place	 ‘in	 the	 streets’:	 small	 local	 consciousness‐raising	 groups,	 grassroots	 groups	 linked	 by	
word‐of‐mouth	 and	 hand‐printed	 newsletters,	 a	 sprouting	 of	 local	 rape‐crisis	 centers	 and	
women’s	shelters	run	by	volunteers	in	private	homes	or	low‐rent	storefronts,	all	punctuated	by	
mass	public	demonstrations	for	women’s	rights	(Allen	1970;	Stansell	2010).	In	other	words,	in	
relation	 to	 male‐dominated	 institutions	 like	 the	 state,	 the	 economy,	 military,	 religion	 or	
medicine,	 feminism	 in	 the	 US	 was	 mostly	 on	 the	 outside	 looking	 in	 (with	 academia,	 where	
feminists	gained	an	earlier	foothold,	a	partial	exception).	The	1970s,	then,	was	a	time	of	deeply	
entrenched	 gender	 inequality	 across	 all	 institutions,	 against	 which	 a	 grassroots	 women’s	
movement	 was	 organizing	 on	 many	 fronts,	 characteristically	 in	 alliance	 with	 gay	 rights	 and	
other	social	justice	movements.		
	
By	the	early	1970s	a	few	US	men	–	many	of	them	veterans	of	the	new	left,	anti‐war	and	student	
movements	 –	 responded	 to	 the	 re‐emergence	 of	 feminism	 in	 the	 1960s	 by	 organizing	men’s	
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consciousness‐raising	groups	and	networks,	and	asking	a	potentially	subversive	question:		what	
does	 feminism	have	 to	do	with	us	 (Men’s	Consciousness‐Raising	Group	1971)?	 	 Some	 leaders	
promoted	 the	 idea	of	 a	 ‘men’s	 liberation	movement’	 that	would	work	 symmetrically	with	 the	
women’s	 liberation	movement	 to	bring	 about	progressive	personal	and	social	 change	 (Farrell	
1974;	Nichols	1975).	They	reasoned	that	a	men’s	liberation	program	that	emphasized	potential	
gains	for	men	might	draw	more	interest	than	one	that	positioned	men	as	oppressors	whose	only	
morally	 correct	 action	was	guilty	 self‐flagellation.	The	 language	of	 sex	 roles,	 emerging	at	 that	
time	as	the	dominant	discourse	of	liberal	feminism	–	just	one	of	multiple	feminist	positions	that	
emerged	in	the	wake	of	the	1960s	rebirth	of	feminism	–	was	an	ideal	means	through	which	to	
package	feminism	for	men	in	a	way	that	lessened	the	guilt	and	maximized	the	potential	gain	that	
men	might	expect	from	‘liberation’	(Messner	1998).	The	‘female	sex	role’	had	clearly	oppressed	
women,	men’s	liberationists	argued,	and	‘the	male	sex	role’	also	harmed	men.		
	
Leaders	posited	men’s	liberation	as	the	logical	flipside	of	women’s	liberation,	but	they	walked	a	
tightrope	from	the	start.	They	acknowledged	that	sexism	had	oppressed	women	and	privileged	
men;	 it	 was	 pretty	 hard	 to	 ignore	 that	 59	 per	 cent	 wage	 gap,	 the	 obvious	 lack	 of	 women	 in	
political	and	corporate	leadership	positions,	or	the	ubiquitous	violence	against	women.	But	they	
sought	 to	 attract	 men	 to	 feminism	 by	 stressing	 how	 the	 ‘male	 sex	 role’	 was	 ‘impoverished’,	
‘unhealthy’,	 even	 ‘lethal’	 for	 men’s	 health,	 emotional	 lives	 and	 relationships	 (Jourard	 1974).	
Thus,	 from	the	outset,	there	was	tension	in	men’s	liberation’s	attempt	to	focus	simultaneously	
on	men’s	institutional	power	over	women	and	on	the	‘costs	of	masculinity’	to	men.	Savvy	men’s	
liberation	leaders	sought	to	connect	these	seemingly	contradictory	positions	by	demonstrating	
that	it	was	in	fact	men’s	attempts	to	secure	access	to	the	institutional	privileges	of	masculinity	
that	enforced	boys’	and	men’s	emotional	stoicism,	lack	of	empathy	for	self	and	others,	physical	
risk‐taking,	 and	 unhealthy	 daily	 practices	 like	 smoking	 and	 drinking.	 Progressive	 men’s	
liberationists	drew	from	the	works	of	psychologist	Joseph	Pleck	(1977)	who	argued	that	while	
women	 were	 oppressed	 by	 the	 female	 sex	 role,	 men	 were	 privileged	 and	 simultaneously	
dehumanized	 by	 the	male	 sex	 role.	 The	 social	 change	 corollary	 to	 this	was	 the	 assertion	 that,	
when	men	committed	themselves	to	bringing	about	full	equality	for	women,	this	would	create	
the	conditions	for	the	full	humanization	of	men,	 including	healthier	and	longer	lives	and	more	
satisfying	relationships	with	intimate	partners,	friends,	and	children.	
	
It	did	not	take	long	before	serious	slippage	began	to	occur	with	men’s	liberationists’	attempts	to	
navigate	the	tension	between	emphasizing	men’s	privileges	and	the	costs	of	masculinity.	 	Less	
politically	 progressive	 leaders	 began	 to	 assert	 a	 false	 symmetry,	 viewing	men	 and	women	 as	
differently	 but	 equally	 oppressed	 by	 sex	 roles	 (Farrell	 1974;	 Goldberg	 1976).	 This	 assertion	
generated	 critical	 distrust	 from	 politically	 radical	 women,	 and	 vigorous	 debate	 from	 more	
politically	 radical	men	 in	 the	movement.	By	 the	mid‐to‐late	1970’s,	men’s	 liberation	had	 split	
directly	 along	 this	 fissure.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	men’s	 rights	 organizations	 stressed	 the	 costs	 of	
narrow	conceptions	of	masculinity	to	men,	and	either	downplayed	or	angrily	disputed	feminist	
claims	 that	 patriarchy	 benefited	men	 at	 women’s	 expense.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 profeminist	
(sometimes	called	‘anti‐sexist’)	men’s	movement	emphasized	the	primary	importance	of	joining	
with	 women	 to	 do	 away	 with	 men’s	 institutionalized	 privileges.	 Patriarchy	 may	 dehumanize	
men,	 profeminists	 continued	 to	 insist,	 but	 the	 costs	 that	 men	 pay	 for	 adherence	 to	 narrow	
conceptions	of	masculinity	are	linked	to	the	promise	of	patriarchal	power	and	privilege.		
	
In	short,	men’s	liberation	had	premised	itself	upon	a	liberal	language	of	symmetrical	sex	roles,	
which	contributed	both	to	its	promise	as	a	movement	and	to	its	eventual	demise.	Following	the	
fissuring	 of	 men’s	 liberation,	 the	 men’s	 rights	 movement	 continued	 to	 deploy	 a	 narrowly	
conservative	language	of	sex	roles.	Now	severed	from	its	progressive	roots,	a	more	reactionary	
tendency	 within	 the	 men’s	 rights	 movement	 unleashed	 overtly	 anti‐feminist	 and	 sometimes	
outright	misogynist	discourse	and	actions	(Baumli	1985).	Meanwhile,	the	emergent	profeminist	
men’s	movement	largely	rejected	the	language	of	sex	roles,	adopting	instead	a	radical	language	
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of	gender	relations	that	facilitated	an	activist	focus	on	ending	men’s	institutional	privileges	and	
men’s	violence	against	women	(Messner	1997,	1998).		
	
By	the	mid‐1970s	the	women’s	movement	had	altered	the	political	context	in	ways	that	made	
amen’s	rights	movement	possible,	if	not	inevitable.	The	men’s	rights	movement	was	not	simply	
a	 kneejerk	 backlash	 against	 feminism;	 it	 was	 a	 movement	 that	 co‐opted	 the	 liberal	 feminist	
language	 of	 symmetrical	 sex	 roles	 and	 then	 turned	 this	 language	 back	 on	 itself.	 	 Men’s	
liberationist‐turned	men’s	rights	advocate	Warren	Farrell	(1974),	for	instance,	borrowed	Betty	
Friedan’s	 (1963)	 idea	 that	 a	 ‘feminine	 mystique’	 oppressed	 women,	 arguing	 that	 men	 were	
trapped	 in	 a	 ‘masculine	 mystique’	 that	 narrowly	 positioned	 them	 as	 breadwinners	 and	
protectors.	 In	 response	 to	 feminist	criticisms	of	 the	effects	on	women	of	being	constructed	as	
‘sex	objects’,	Farrell	posited	an	equally	negative	effect	on	men	in	being	constructed	as	‘success	
objects’.	Herb	Goldberg’s	1976	book	The	Hazards	of	Being	Male	asserted	that	male	privilege	is	a	
‘myth’.	Men	actually	have	it	worse	than	women,	Goldberg	argued,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	male	
role	 is	 far	 more	 rigid	 than	 the	 female	 role,	 and	 because	 women	 have	 created	 a	 movement	
through	which	they	can	now	transcend	the	limits	of	culturally‐imposed	femininity.	Men’s	rights	
organizations	 broke	 from	 the	 men’s	 liberation	 movement’s	 gender	 symmetry	 and	 began	 to	
articulate	a	distinct	discourse	of	overt	and	angry	anti‐feminist	backlash.	By	the	late	1970’s	and	
early	1980’s,	men’s	rights	advocates	were	claiming	that	men	are	the	true	victims	of	prostitution,	
pornography,	 dating	 rituals,	 sexist	 media	 conventions,	 divorce	 settlements,	 false	 rape	
accusations,	 sexual	 harassment,	 and	 domestic	 violence	 (Baumli	 1985).	 And	 in	 subsequent	
decades,	 the	beating	heart	 of	 the	men’s	 rights	movement	has	been	organizations	 that	 focus	 –	
largely	through	the	Internet	–	on	fighting	for	fathers’	rights,	especially	 in	legal	cases	involving	
divorce	and	child	custody	(Dragiewicz	2008;	Menzies	2007).		
	
Shifting	gender	formations	
In	the	1980s	and	into	the	1990s	the	radical	power	of	feminism	fractured	under	a	broadside	of	
anti‐feminist	backlash	(Faludi	1991),	and	fragmented	internally	from	corrosive	disputes	among	
feminists	around	issues	of	race	and	class	inequalities,	and	divisive	schisms	that	centered	on	sex	
work	 and	 pornography	 (Echols	 2002).	 Some	 key	 political	 efforts	 by	US	 feminists	 such	 as	 the	
Equal	Rights	Amendment	(ERA)	had	failed,	and	feminism	was	less	visible	as	a	mass	movement.	
However	 in	 1989	 sociologist	 Verta	 Taylor	 argued	 that	 the	 US	 feminist	 movement	 had	 not	
disappeared;	 rather,	 this	 was	 a	 time	 of	 ‘movement	 abeyance’,	 when	 activists	 in	 submerged	
networks	 continued	 to	 fight	 for	 equality,	 sustaining	 below‐the‐radar	 efforts	 that	 created	 the	
possibility	 for	 future	political	mobilizations.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	Canada,	Australia	 and	other	
jurisdictions	 where	 women’s	 policy	 machineries	 were	 established,	 feminist	 networking	 and	
activism	went	 ‘mainstream’,	as	did	states’	commitment	to	gender	mainstreaming	globally	(see	
Bacchi	and	Eveline	2003;	Franzway,	Court	and	Connell	1989).	
	
But	 there	 was	 something	 more	 happening	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 US	 gender	 politics	 than	
‘movement	abeyance’.	Feminist	momentum	from	the	1970s	and	networks	of	 feminist	activists	
combined	with	 three	 substantial	 and	 interrelated	 social	 changes:	 	 the	 institutionalization	 and	
professionalization	 of	 feminism;	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 widespread	 postfeminist	 cultural	
sensibility;	 and	 shifts	 in	 the	 political	 economy,	 including	 deindustrialization	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 a	
neoliberal	 state	 that	 slashes	 taxes	 for	 corporations	 and	 the	 rich,	 cuts	 public	 welfare	 and	
education,	 and	 celebrates	 individualism	 and	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	market.	 These	 three	 changes	
created	 the	 current	 moment	 of	 gender	 formation	 that	 makes	 possible	 a	 range	 of	 men’s	
engagements	 with	 gender	 politics,	 including	 men’s	 rights	 organizing	 and	 profeminist	 men’s	
activism	that	take	substantially	different	forms	than	they	did	in	the	1970s.	
	
Professionally	institutionalized	feminism	
The	mass	feminist	movement	was	in	decline	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	United	States,	but	this	was	
also	a	time	of	successful	and	highly	visible	feminist	institutional	reform,	including	the	building	
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of	large	feminist	advocacy	organizations	like	the	National	Organization	for	Women	(NOW)	and	
the	National	Abortion	Rights	Action	League	 (NARAL),	 the	 institutionalization	 of	women’s	 and	
gender	 studies	 in	 universities,	 and	 the	 stabilization	 of	myriad	 community	 and	 campus‐based	
rape	 crisis	 and	 domestic	 violence	 centers	 (Martin	 1990).	 Thus,	 as	 was	 occurring	 in	 Canada,	
Australia	 and	elsewhere,	 feminists	 reformed	police	practices	 and	 legal	 responses	 to	 rape	 and	
domestic	violence;	workplaces	 incorporated	 sexual	harassment	 trainings;	 and	 schools	 revised	
sexist	curricula	and	expanded	opportunities	for	girls’	sports.	These	reforms	were	accompanied	
by	the	creation	and	expansion	of	professional	sub‐fields	and	occupational	niches	that	focused	on	
women’s	issues	in	social	work,	law	and	psychology.	
	
The	institutionalization	of	feminism	created	new	challenges	for	feminists,	not	the	least	of	which	
was	what	Markowitz	and	Tice	(2002)	called	‘the	paradoxes	of	professionalization’.		On	the	one	
hand,	professionalization	created	the	conditions	for	sustaining	feminist	reform	efforts	on	many	
fronts,	 including	 the	 creation	 of	 career	 paths	 for	 feminists	 in	 law,	 academia,	medicine,	 social	
work	and	other	professions	(Staggenborg	1988).	But	on	the	other	hand	it	 led	to	a	diversion	of	
activist	 energies	 away	 from	 radical	 social	 change	 efforts	 toward	 finding	 sustainable	 funding	
sources	 for	 service	 provision,	 and	 also	 ushered	 in	 different	 organizational	 processes,	 with	
bureaucratic	 hierarchies	 displacing	 earlier	 feminist	 commitments	 to	 democratic	 decision‐
making	processes.	
	
US	 feminists	also	managed	to	wrest	significant	concessions	 from	the	state,	 including	the	1974	
passage	 of	 Title	 IX	 (federal	 law	 related	 to	 gender	 equity	 in	 schools),	 and	 the	 1994	 Violence	
Against	 Women	 Act,	 which	 altered	 the	 landscape	 for	 feminist	 work	 against	 gender‐based	
violence.	Even	given	the	fact	that	state	support	for	women’s	issues	in	the	US	remained	minimal,	
Kristen	 Bumiller	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 such	 ‘feminist	 collaboration	with	 the	 state’	 threatens	 to	
water	down,	or	even	sever,	the	language	and	grassroots	politics	of	feminism.	Moreover,	with	the	
continuing	decline	of	 the	welfare	 state	 and	 the	 concomitant	 expansion	of	neoliberalism,	what	
Ruth	Gilmore	(2007)	calls	‘the	non‐profit	industrial	complex’	emerged	as	a	sort	of	‘shadow	state’	
(Wolch	1990),	funded	by	an	exploding	number	of	foundations,	and	advancing	professionalized	
public	health‐oriented	approaches	to	issues	like	violence	against	women.		
	
The	rise	of	professionally	institutionalized	feminism,	in	short,	broadened	and	stabilized	the	field	
of	 feminist	action,	while	simultaneously	 thinning	 its	political	depth,	 threatening	even	 to	make	
feminist	 language	 and	 analysis	 disappear	 altogether:	 	 university	 women’s	 studies	 programs	
become	‘gender	studies	programs’;	‘violence	against	women’	morphs	to	‘gender‐based	violence’;	
and	 feminist	 organizations	 created	 by	 and	 for	 women	 become	 mixed‐gender	 organizations	
whose	historical	roots	are	easily	forgotten	in	the	crush	of	day‐to‐day	struggles	to	measure	and	
document	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 service	 provisions,	 needed	 to	 win	 continued	 funding	 from	
foundations	or	the	state	(Messner,	Greenberg	and	Peretz	2015).	Professionally	institutionalized	
feminism	was	also	accompanied	by	a	widespread	shift	in	cultural	values	about	gender:	namely,	
the	emergence	of	a	postfeminist	sensibility.		
	
Postfeminism	
As	 movement	 feminism	 receded	 from	 public	 view	 in	 the	 1990s,	 a	 new	 and	 controversial	
‘postfeminist’	discourse	emerged.	Feminist	scholars	have	explored	and	debated	the	claim	that	a	
whole	generation	of	younger	people	express	a	postfeminist	worldview.	On	the	one	side,	drawing	
from	public	opinion	data,	sociologists	Hall	and	Rodriguez	(2003)	found	little	support	for	claims	
of	widespread	adherence	to	postfeminism,	which	they	defined	as	including	anti‐feminist	beliefs.	
But	 on	 the	 other	 side	 most	 scholars	 have	 drawn	 a	 distinction	 between	 postfeminism	 and	
opposition	 to	 feminism.	Postfeminist	narratives	normally	 include	an	appreciation	 for	 feminist	
accomplishments,	coupled	with	a	belief	that	the	work	of	feminism	is	 in	the	past,	and	thus	that	
feminist	 collective	 action	 is	 no	 longer	 necessary	 (Butler	 2013).	 Sociologist	 Jo	 Reger	 (2012)	
argues	that	younger	women	and	men	for	the	most	part	agree	with	feminist	positions	on	equal	
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opportunities	 for	women	and	men,	but	 tend	 to	experience	 feminism	as	both	 ‘everywhere	and	
nowhere’.	 The	 ‘everywhere’	 refers	 both	 to	 feminism’s	 professional	 institutionalization	 and	 to	
the	ways	that	liberal	feminist	values	have	permeated	popular	culture	in	much	the	same	way	that	
fluoride	invisibly	permeates	public	drinking	water	(in	fact,	Reger	(2012)	refers	to	today’s	youth	
as	 ‘generation	 fluoride’).	 However,	 feminism	 today	 is	 also	 experienced	 as	 ‘nowhere’:	 young	
people	do	not	see	an	in‐the‐streets	mass	feminist	movement,	nor	do	they	see	any	reason	for	one.	
The	 continuing	 work	 of	 professional	 feminism	 is,	 to	 most	 young	 people,	 as	 invisible	 as	 the	
cavity‐prevention	work	of	fluoride	in	our	public	waters.		
	
As	 with	 any	 widely	 shared	 generational	 sensibility,	 postfeminism	 contains	 its	 own	
contradictions	 and	 limits.	 Most	 of	 the	 younger	 women	 in	 the	 supposedly	 ‘postfeminist’	
generation	 studied	 by	 Aronson	 (2003)	 appreciated	 the	 accomplishments	 of	 the	 feminist	
movement	 and	 many	 recognized	 the	 existence	 of	 continued	 gender	 inequalities.	 However,	
Aronson	described	roughly	half	of	them	as	 ‘fence‐sitters’,	passive	supporters	of	feminist	goals,	
thus	 leaving	open	 the	question	of	 how,	or	under	what	 conditions,	postfeminist	 consciousness	
might	 convert	 to	 feminist	 identification	 and	 political	 action.	 Pomerantz	 and	 her	 colleagues	
(2013)	show	that	postfeminist	discourse	makes	it	hard	for	school	girls	to	name	sexism	when	it	
happens,	yet	they	argue	that	postfeminist	narratives	have	a	built‐in	instability,	especially	when	
they	run	up	against	the	lived	reality	of	continuing	sexist	constraints	on	girls.	For	instance,	girls	
and	young	women	(often	supported	by	their	fathers	and	mothers)	can	become	instant	gender‐
equity	activists	when	they	discover	that	they	are	not	being	given	equal	athletic	opportunities	in	
schools	 or	 colleges,	 or	when	 college	women	 survivors	 of	 sexual	 assault	 learn	 that	 their	 own	
institutions	are	neither	supporting	them	nor	holding	perpetrators	accountable.	In	other	words,	
when	groups	of	girls	and	women	bump	up	against	sexist	institutional	constraints,	it	is	possible	
for	an	individualist	postfeminist	sensibility	to	convert	to	collective	feminist	actions.	And	when	it	
does,	 such	 feminist	 action	 is	 often	 given	 form	 and	 facilitated	 by	 existing	 institutionalized	
professional	feminism	–	for	instance,	campus	rape	crisis	centers	or	women’s	law	centers.	
	
This	feminist	optimism,	however,	faces	an	uphill	struggle	against	the	regressive	tendencies	built	
into	 a	 postfeminist	 sensibility	 that	 is	 coterminous	 with	 a	 larger	 political	 shift	 to	 neoliberal	
celebrations	 of	 individual	 market	 consumption	 choices	 as	 drivers	 for	 progress.	 And	
postfeminism	 is	perfectly	 consistent	with	–	 indeed	 is	 shaped	by	 and	helps	 to	naturalize	–	 the	
eclipse	 of	 feminist	 language	 and	 politics	 within	 the	 professionalized	 non‐profit	 industrial	
complex.	Postfeminism	also	works	in	tandem	with	shifts	in	the	political	economy,	including	the	
nearly	 four‐decade‐long	 trend	 of	 deindustrialization	 that	 accompanied	 the	 ascendance	 of	
neoliberalism	 and	 that	 has	 disproportionately	 rendered	 poor	 and	 blue‐collar	 young	 men	
redundant,	a	shift	eventually	referred	to	by	some	as	‘the	decline	of	men’.	
	
Deindustrialization	and	‘the	decline	of	men’	
The	 early	 1980s	 recession	 accelerated	 a	 continuing	deindustrialization	 of	 the	American	 labor	
force	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 elimination	 of	millions	 of	 unionized	 jobs,	 rising	 levels	 of	 structural	
unemployment,	and	the	growth	of	low‐paid	non‐unionized	service	sector	jobs	(Wilson	1989).	As	
in	 the	 UK	 under	 Margaret	 Thatcher,	 in	 Australia	 under	 John	 Howard,	 and	 in	 Canada	 under	
Stephen	Harper,	the	policies	of	Reaganomics	facilitated	this	economic	restructuring	by	tugging	
the	nation	away	from	a	New	Deal/Great	Society	welfare	state	toward	a	state	based	on	neoliberal	
ideas	that	celebrated	individualism	and	the	primacy	of	the	market,	while	slashing	taxes	on	rich	
individuals	 and	 corporations	 and	 cutting	 support	 for	 welfare	 and	 education.	 These	 shifts	
continued	 in	 subsequent	 decades,	 resulting	 in	 the	 dramatic	 growth	 of	 a	 super‐rich	 class	 of	
people,	a	shrinking	middle	class	and	a	growing	proportion	of	working	poor	in	the	population.		
The	 economic	 restructuring	 that	 accelerated	 from	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 had	 multiple	 and	
devastating	effects;	however,	for	my	purposes	here,	I	want	to	focus	on	how	the	neoliberalization	
of	the	economy	was	especially	devastating	for	families	headed	by	blue	collar	male	wage	earners.	
As	women	flowed	into	the	labor	market	by	the	millions	–	as	much	out	of	necessity	as	for	reasons	
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sparked	by	 ideals	of	 feminist	empowerment	–	 the	more	educated	ones	poured	 into	a	growing	
field	of	professional	occupations,	while	the	greater	mass	of	women	filled	an	expanding	array	of	
low‐paid	pink	collar	and	service	sector	jobs	(Charles	and	Grusky	2004).	While	professional	class	
men	continued	to	fare	reasonably	well	in	this	economic	restructuring,	blue	collar	and	poor	men	
–	disproportionately	men	of	color	–	 faced	an	 increasingly	bleak	 field	of	economic	opportunity	
(Wilson	1996).		
	
As	 the	 1990s	 came	 to	 a	 close,	 Connell	 (1995)	 documented	 how	 the	 crumbling	 structural	
foundation	 for	 the	 male	 breadwinner	 role	 had	 escalated	 the	 gender	 insecurities	 of	 young	
working	class	men.	Deteriorating	public	schools,	declining	hope	for	decent	 jobs	in	inner	cities,	
and	the	expansion	of	prisons	combined	to	create	–	especially	for	younger	generations	of	black	
and	 brown	 boys	 and	 young	men	 –	 contexts	 conducive	 to	 skyrocketing	 school	 dropout	 rates,	
neighborhood	 gang	 activity,	 illegal	 commerce	 in	 the	 informal	 economy,	 and	 high	 levels	 of	
domestic	abuse	and	other	forms	of	violence	against	women	(DeKeseredy,	Shahid	and	Schwartz	
2003;	Flores	and	Hondagneu‐Sotelo	2013;	Rios	2011).	And	right	at	the	time,	when	the	broader	
culture	 is	 trumpeting	 the	 arrival	 of	 ‘involved	 fatherhood’,	 the	 constraints	 on	 young	 poor	 and	
working	class	men	make	the	achievement	of	the	middle	class	ideal	of	an	involved	breadwinning	
father	increasingly	unreachable.		
	
Men	and	gender	politics	today	
The	 three	 trends	 I	 have	 outlined	 –	 professionally	 institutionalized	 feminism,	 the	 emergent	
culture	 of	 postfeminism,	 and	 a	 post‐industrial	 political	 economy	 characterized	 by	
deindustrialization	 and	 neoliberal	 state	 policies	 –	 together	 help	 to	 constitute	 the	 present	
moment	of	gender	formation.	Next,	I	will	sketch	how	these	three	trends	together	make	possible	
particular	forms	of	men’s	antifeminist	and	profeminist	actions.		
	
Possibilities	for	antifeminist	men’s	rights	activism	
By	the	2000s,	shifts	in	the	political	economy,	combined	with	the	increased	visibility	of	women	in	
higher	 education,	 popular	 culture	 and	 politics,	 and	 the	 growing	 public	 awareness	 of	 the	
institutionalization	of	women’s	rights,	sparked	journalistic	and	political	hand‐wringing	about	a	
supposed	‘war	against	boys’	in	public	schools	and	a	widespread	‘decline	of	males’	in	the	public	
sphere	 (Sommers	 2001;	 Tiger	 2000).	 These	 escalating	 public	 concerns	 about	 boys	 and	 men	
created	fertile	ground	for	a	resurgent	men’s	rights	movement.	
	
But	it	is	unlikely	that	we	will	see	a	widely	popular	or	even	marginally	successful	frontal	attack	
on	feminism	from	men’s	rights	groups.	This	is	in	part	because	the	same	postfeminist	sensibility	
that	views	feminism	as	a	movement	of	the	past	is	likely	also	to	view	aggressively	anti‐feminist	
men’s	rights	activism	as	atavistically	misogynistic.	As	values	favoring	public	equality	for	women	
are	increasingly	institutionalized	and	defined	not	in	a	language	of	politicized	feminism	but	more	
in	a	common	sense	language	of	equity	and	fairness,	this	shift	also	contracts	the	possibilities	for	
anti‐feminism.	 In	 a	 sense,	 I	 am	 suggesting	 that	 the	 institutional	 deck	 is	 stacked	 against	 overt	
anti‐feminist	 backlash,	 be	 it	 frontal	 attacks	 on	 Title	 IX	 in	 schools,	 or	 men’s	 rights	 groups’	
challenges	 to	 the	state’s	 (still	minimal)	 support	 for	women’s	 shelters.	While	 this	outcome	can	
and	should	be	seen	as	feminist	success,	I	am	not	arguing	that	it	is	time	for	a	celebratory	feminist	
victory	lap.	History,	to	be	sure,	has	not	ended.	Dragiewicz’s	(2008,	2011)	research	on	US	men’s	
rights	groups’	 attempts	 to	 stop	state	 funding	of	women’s	 shelters	 shows	how	 this	moment	of	
gender	formation	still	includes	openings	for	anti‐feminist	backlash,	as	does	Girard’s	(2009)	and	
Mann’s	 (2012)	 research	 on	 similar	 efforts	 in	 Canada.	 However	 the	 story	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	
research	 also	 illustrates	 the	 legal	 limits	 of	 such	backlash;	 after	 all,	 professional	 feminist	 legal	
activists	 defeated	 the	 anti‐feminist	 actions	 analyzed	 by	Dragiewicz,	 Girard	 and	Mann.	 Today,	
contingent	 on	 the	 specifics	 of	 national	 political	 developments,	 institutionalized	 feminism	
continues	to	influence	legal	and	other	decision	making,	albeit	in	a	context	that	is	often	marked	
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by	 deep	 controversy	 (Brodie	 2008).	 Arguably,	 institutionalized	 feminism	 in	 the	 US	 now	
occupies	a	legal	high	ground,	notwithstanding	one	that	is	still	sometimes	contested.		
	
Rather	than	overt	anti‐feminist	backlash,	I	argue	that	what	is	more	likely	to	gain	traction	today	
in	the	US	is	a	‘kinder,	gentler’	form	of	men’s	rights	discourse	and	organizing,	such	as	that	now	
characterized	by	Warren	Farrell,	often	considered	the	‘godfather’	of	the	men’s	rights	movement.	
Farrell’s	 analysis	 in	 the	1980s	 and	 early	 1990s	 drifted	 from	 the	 liberal	 feminist	 symmetry	 of	
men’s	 liberation	 to	asserting	 in	his	book	The	Myth	of	Male	Power	 (1993)	 that	 there	are	many	
ways	 in	 which	 men	 are	 victimized	 by	 women’s	 less	 visible	 forms	 of	 power.	 For	 instance,	 in	
response	to	women’s	attempts	to	stop	sexual	harassment	in	workplaces,	Farrell	claimed	that	in	
fact	 it	 was	 male	 employers	 who	 were	 disempowered	 and	 victimized	 by	 their	 secretaries’	
‘miniskirt	 power,	 cleavage	 power,	 and	 flirtation	 power’.	 In	 his	 more	 recent	 public	 speeches,	
however,	Farrell	 appears	 to	have	 returned	 to	a	 less	 combative	 language	of	 gender	 symmetry,	
reminiscent	of	his	mid‐1970s	perspective	(Farrell	2014).	While	it	may	seem	on	the	surface	that	
men	are	privileged	with	higher	status	and	higher	paying	 jobs,	Farrell	asserts,	men	pay	a	huge	
price	 for	accepting	the	 increased	responsibilities	that	come	with	these	 jobs.	Women	just	don’t	
choose	to	enter	higher	paying	careers,	he	claims,	and	they	are	smart	to	reject	the	stress;	their	
lives	 are	 better	 for	 it.	 Farrell’s	 insistence	 that	 gender	 divisions	 of	 labor	 result	 not	 from	
institutional	 discrimination	 against	 women,	 but	 rather	 from	 the	 accumulated	 individual	
‘choices’	 of	women	 and	men	 is	 consistent	with	 current	 neoliberal	 cheerleading	 for	 individual	
women	 to	 ‘lean	 in’	 to	 compete	with	men	 as	 professionals	 or	 corporate	 leaders.	 But	 Farrell’s	
twist	 is	 that	women’s	 refusals	 to	 lean	 in	and	compete	are	actually	healthy	and	smart	choices;	
men	are	the	chumps	for	working	so	hard	for	public	success.	
	
Farrell’s	 strategy	 is	 to	 raise	 sympathies	 for	men,	not	 to	engage	 in	anti‐feminist	polemics.	 In	a	
postfeminist	 context,	 this	 more	 moderate	 men’s	 rights	 discourse	 is	 likely	 to	 ring	 true	 as	
reasonable,	 as	 common	 sense.	 In	 this	 worldview,	 the	 women’s	 movement	 succeeded	 in	
improving	women’s	lives,	and	the	logical	flip‐side	is	this:	in	the	absence	of	a	symmetrical	men’s	
movement	 to	 improve	 men’s	 lives,	 men	 suffer	 harm.	While	 anti‐feminist	 vitriol	 continues	 to	
mark	men’s	rights	discourse	on	the	Internet	(Dragiewicz	2008,	2011),	the	emergent	‘moderate’	
voice	 of	 the	men’s	 rights	 movement	 does	 not	 directly	 attack	 feminism	 or	 disparage	 women.	
Rather,	it	maneuvers	in	the	postfeminist	interstices	between	the	‘everywhere’	and	the	‘nowhere’	
of	 feminism.	 The	 means	 to	 improve	 men’s	 lives	 are	 articulated	 to	 the	 general	 public	 in	 a	
depoliticized	 and	 individualized	 ‘equality	 language’	 (Behre	 2015)	 that	 resonates	 in	 a	
postfeminist	 and	 neoliberal	 context	 where	 present‐day	 feminism	 seems	 to	 be	 ‘nowhere’.	
Meanwhile,	leaders	such	as	Farrell	(2014)	are	apparently	coming	to	realize	that	they	need	not	
rant	 to	a	men’s	rights	audience	 that	 feminism	 is	 ‘everywhere’,	privileging	women	and	holding	
men	down.	This	is	what	these	men	already	know;	it	is	the	fluoride	in	their	ideological	waters.		
	
As	a	result,	men’s	rights	rhetoric	that	contains	an	implicit	anti‐feminism	is	likely	to	resonate	with	
men	who	feel	insecure	or	embattled.	And	I	would	speculate	that	moderate	men’s	rights	leaders’	
focus	on	individual	choice	and	their	implicit	antifeminism	resonates	best	with	educated	middle	
class	white	men	who	do	not	want	 to	appear	 to	be	backwards	misogynists.	A	central	aspect	of	
privileged	 men’s	 gender	 strategies	 in	 recent	 years,	 after	 all,	 is	 to	 present	 one’s	 self	 as	 an	
educated	 modern	 man	 who	 is	 supportive	 of	 gender	 equality.	 And	 this	 is	 achieved	 partly	 by	
projecting	atavistic	sexism	on	to	less	educated	men,	poor	men,	immigrant	men	and	men	of	color	
(Dekeseredy,	Shahid	and	Schwartz	2003;	Hondagneu‐Sotelo	and	Messner	1994).	
	
In	this	context,	is	there	a	potential	for	less	educated	poor	and	working	class	men	to	constitute	a	
sort	of	lumpen	anti‐feminist	army	for	men’s	rights?	After	all,	declining	economic	opportunities	
for	 working	 class	 men	 to	 achieve	 a	 traditional	 conception	 of	 the	 male	 breadwinner	 role,	
combined	with	the	perception	that	the	law	favors	mothers	over	fathers	in	divorce	and	custody	
settlements	might	seem	to	create	a	perfect	storm	for	the	creation	of	an	army	of	angry	working	
class	fathers	ready	to	join	men’s	rights	organizations	(Kimmel	2013).	Thus	far,	this	has	hardly	
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been	the	case.	Most	leaders	of	the	men’s	rights	movement	are	not	poor	and	working	class	men;	
rather,	they	are	men	with	the	educational	and	financial	resources	needed	to	form	organizations,	
create	websites	or	hire	attorneys.	But	just	as	the	multi‐billionaire	Koch	brothers’	well‐financed	
right	 wing	 anti‐statism	 appeals	 to	 many	 lower‐middle	 class	 whites,	 the	 men’s	 rights	
movement’s	 anti‐feminist	 backlash	 rhetoric	 could	possibly	 appeal	 to	men	with	 less	 education	
and	less	resources,	men	who	may	have	a	powerful	father	hunger	but	feel	that	their	‘rights’	have	
been	denied	them	by	controlling	mothers,	and	especially	by	the	state.		
	
Indeed,	 in	 their	 study	 of	 poor	working	 class	 fathers	 in	 Philadelphia	 and	 Camden,	 sociologists	
Edin	and	Nelson	(2014)	found	that	the	men	they	studied	frequently	express	‘a	profound,	abiding	
mistrust	 of	 women’;	 they	 think	 ‘the	 system’	 that	 enforces	 child	 support	 automatically	 and	
unfairly	 favors	mothers,	who	 themselves	are	gatekeepers	who	keep	 the	men	away	 from	 their	
own	 children.	 These	 men	 feel	 as	 though	 they	 have	 few	 rights,	 while	 both	 mothers	 and	 ‘the	
system’	 treat	 them	as	 though	 they	are	 ‘just	a	paycheck’	 (when	many	of	 these	 fathers	have	no	
regular	paycheck).	In	fact,	this	discourse	is	precisely	what	is	commonly	disseminated	on	men’s	
rights	Internet	sites	(Dragiewicz	2008,	2011;	Mann	2005;	Menzies	2007).	The	common	feminist	
retort	to	fathers’	rights	claims	have	in	the	past	been	something	like	this:	‘When	you	share	fully	
in	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 birth	 control,	 and	 then	 also	 share	 equally	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 child	
support	 and	 childcare	before	divorce,	 then	you	 can	 share	 parental	 rights	 afterwards’.	 But	 the	
stories	 of	 poor	 fathers	 reported	 by	 Edin	 and	 Nelson	 (2014)	 illustrate	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 this	
rejoinder.	These	are	men	who	desire	deeply	to	be	foundational	and	present	in	their	children’s	
lives,	but	who	face	seemingly	insurmountable	institutional	barriers	to	achieving	and	sustaining	
this	parental	ideal.	To	date,	there	is	very	little	evidence	that	masses	of	poor	fathers	are	joining	
as	 foot	 soldiers	 in	 anti‐feminist	 collective	 action.	But	 if	 current	 industrial	 nations	 continue	 to	
lack	the	will	to	address	the	many	ways	in	which	a	huge	strata	of	young	men	are	being	treated	as	
dispensable	by	 the	economy	and	 the	criminal	 justice	 system,	 it	 is	possible	 that	 some	of	 these	
men	will	 find	 resonance	with	 Internet‐based	anti‐feminist	men’s	 rights	discourse	 that	blames	
women	and	the	liberal	state	for	men’s	woes.	
	
Possibilities	for	men’s	profeminist	activism	
The	 recent	 institutionalization	 and	 professionalization	 of	 feminism	 has	 included	 a	 modest	
expansion	 of	 opportunities	 for	 men	 professionals	 to	 work	 on	 gender	 issues	 in	 social	 work,	
academia,	law	and	other	fields.	This	expanding	base	of	men’s	professional	action	in	gender	fields	
carries	 both	 promise	 and	 risk.	 Especially	 given	 the	 recent	 explosions	 of	 public	 awareness	 of	
sexual	assault	and	domestic	violence	in	academia,	the	military	and	men’s	sports,	this	moment	of	
opportunity	and	risk	is	nowhere	more	apparent	than	within	the	array	of	professional	fields	that	
confront	violence	against	women.	In	2014,	even	the	President	of	the	United	States	–	not	usually	
a	platform	for	feminist	calls	for	action	–	called	on	men	to	take	an	active	role	in	ending	violence	
against	women.		
	
Feminist	women	toiled	for	the	past	half‐century	to	transform	public	awareness	about	violence	
against	women,	and	to	create	and	sustain	rape	crisis	centers	and	domestic	violence	shelters.	For	
the	most	part,	feminist	women	welcome	male	allies	who	step	up	to	prevent	future	acts	of	sexual	
and	 domestic	 violence.	 But	 some	 feminists	 in	 the	 anti‐rape	 and	 anti‐domestic	 violence	
community	 are	 also	 cautious	 about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 male	 allies	 still	 benefit	 from	 male	
privilege	 that	works	 to	 the	detriment	 of	women	 professional	 colleagues	 (Messner,	 Greenberg	
and	Peretz	2015).	And	in	a	context	of	postfeminism,	long‐time	feminist	activists	fear	that,	just	as	
the	 field	of	 gender‐based	violence	prevention	has	expanded	 to	 include	more	men,	 the	politics	
underlying	 anti‐violence	 actions	 have	 thinned,	 severing	 action	 from	 feminist	 historical	 and	
political	roots	(Greenberg	and	Messner	2014).		
	
In	 short,	 I	 suggest	 that	 while	 feminists	 continue	 to	 strategize	 vigilantly	 against	 eruptions	 of	
misogynist	anti‐feminist	backlash,	a	less	obvious	but	perhaps	greater	challenge	springs	from	the	
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ways	in	which	the	very	conditions	of	historical	gender	formation	that	facilitate	men’s	movement	
into	professionalized	 ‘gender	work’	also	threaten	to	eclipse	feminism	altogether.	In	particular,	
widespread	 ideologies	 of	 postfeminism,	 coupled	 with	 depoliticized	 and	 marketized	 anti‐
violence	 initiatives,	 threaten	 to	 further	 erase	 feminist	 women’s	 organizational	 leadership	 as	
well	 as	 the	 feminist	 analysis	 that	underlies	 anti‐violence	work.	Today’s	 anti‐violence	workers	
commonly	refer	to	‘the	movement’	not	as	an	eruption	of	mass	activism,	but	as	a	network	of	like‐
minded	anti‐violence	professionals,	and	they	talk	of	‘politics’	not	in	terms	of	activism	aimed	to	
bring	about	 structural	 transformations,	but	as	 strategies	designed	 to	keep	 their	organizations	
funded	 (Messner,	 Greenberg	 and	 Peretz	 2015).	 Much	 of	 the	 violence	 prevention	 curricula	
deployed	 in	 schools	 and	 communities	 today	 has	 jettisoned	 the	 feminist	 idea	 that	 violence	
against	women	springs	from	men’s	over‐conformity	with	dominant	conceptions	of	masculinity,	
instead	deploying	a	pragmatic	(and	more	individualistic)	strategy	of	teaching	boys	and	men	to	
make	‘healthy	choices’	–	a	discourse	that,	not	incidentally,	is	shaped	so	that	it	can	be	subjected	
to	‘metrics’	that	document	program	effectiveness	in	support	of	continuing	requests	for	state	or	
foundation	funds.	
	
What	are	the	forces	that	potentially	counter	the	depoliticization	of	anti‐rape	and	anti‐domestic	
violence	work?	One	–	though	this	is	likely	to	be	temporary	–	is	the	continued	presence	of	older	
feminist	women	 in	 the	 field,	who	mentor	younger	cohorts	of	professional	women	and	men	 in	
ways	that	keep	feminist	analysis	and	goals	at	the	center	of	the	work.	A	second	source	of	change,	
potentially	more	transformative,	 lies	 in	the	recent	growth	of	diversity	among	men	in	the	anti‐
violence	 field.	 As	 the	 field	 has	 expanded	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 opportunities	 for	 men	 to	 work	 in	
internships	 and	 paid	 jobs	 in	 rape	 and	 domestic	 violence	 prevention,	 state	 and	 foundation	
funders	have	increasingly	targeted	violence	prevention	efforts	to	communities	of	boys	and	men	
considered	to	be	‘at	risk’	due	to	poverty,	crumbling	schools,	and	high	rates	of	gang	violence	and	
drug	 use.	 There	 is	 a	 widely	 held	 perception	 in	 the	 field	 today	 that	 boys	 of	 color	 from	 poor	
communities	will	be	more	open	to	learning	from	young	men	from	their	own	communities,	who	
look	and	talk	more	like	they	do.	This	in	turn	has	created	a	demand	for	a	more	racially	diverse	
influx	of	young	men	into	violence	prevention	work.		
	
The	growing	number	of	young	African	American	and	Latino	men	entering	anti‐violence	work	is	
infusing	 a	 much‐needed	 intersectional	 perspective	 into	 professional	 anti‐violence	 work.	
Intersectionality	–	 the	perspective	 that	 takes	 the	 simultaneity	of	gender,	 race,	 class	and	other	
forms	of	 ‘intersecting’	 inequalities	 as	 its	 conceptual	 core	 –	 has	 long	been	 central	 in	 academic	
feminism	 (Collins	 1990;	 Crenshaw	 1991).	 Indeed,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that,	 within	 academic	
feminism,	intersectionality	has	for	some	years	been	a	paradigmatic	theoretical	perspective	and	
research	approach	(McCall	2005).	But	the	radical	insights	of	feminist	intersectionality	risk	being	
diluted	or	even	lost	in	professionally	institutionalized	violence	prevention	efforts.		
	
Men	 of	 color’s	 movement	 into	 professionalized	 anti‐violence	 work	 brings	 to	 the	 field	 not	 so	
much	 a	 background	 in	 academic	 intersectionality	 but,	 rather,	 an	 experience‐based	 organic	
intersectionality,	different	in	two	ways	from	the	experiences	of	most	white	middle‐class	men	in	
the	 field.	 First,	 young	men	 of	 color	 frequently	 begin	with	 a	 commitment	 to	 addressing	 boys’	
vulnerabilities	to	various	forms	of	violence	–	in	the	home,	in	the	street,	and	from	police.	These	
young	men	often	began	working	with	boys	around	gang	and	substance	abuse	issues,	in	college	
internships	 and	 then	 paid	 jobs	 in	 non‐profit	 organizations.	 In	 that	work,	 they	 discovered	 the	
links	between	young	men’s	vulnerabilities	to	multiple	forms	of	violence	with	their	experiences	
with	rape	and	domestic	violence.	In	short,	it	was	through	doing	‘race	and	class’	work	with	young	
men	 that	 many	 of	 these	 anti‐violence	 workers	 ‘discovered’	 gender.	 This	 in	 turn	 created	 the	
possibility	for	an	analysis	of	violence	that	does	not	always	start	with	gender	as	necessarily	being	
foundational	(as	it	so	often	does	with	white	middle	class	men	who	enter	the	anti‐violence	field),	
instead	developing	into	an	intersectional	understanding	of	violence,	grounded	organically	in	the	
everyday	experiences	of	race,	class,	and	gender	as	interlocking	processes	(Messner,	Greenberg	
and	Peretz	2015).		
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This	 organically	 intersectional	 analysis	 underlies	 a	 second	 difference	 between	 young	men	 of	
color	and	white	middle	class	men	in	the	anti‐violence	field.	Young	men	of	color	tend	to	view	the	
now‐standard	curricula	deployed	 in	school‐	and	community‐based	violence	prevention	efforts	
as	flat,	one‐dimensional	and	thus	inadequate.	Instead,	these	young	men	are	innovating	and	even	
departing	 from	 the	 standard	 curricula,	 developing	 approaches	 that	 draw,	 for	 instance,	 from	
‘theatre	of	the	oppressed’,	radical	community	education	pedagogies	that	plumb	the	everyday	life	
experiences	of	boys	in	order	to	‘make	it	real’.	Men	of	color’s	emergent	organically	intersectional	
pedagogies	frequently	also	circle	back	to	academic	feminist	intersectionality,	discovering	there	
a	 ready	 resource	 for	 understanding	 connections	 between	 violence	 against	women	with	 other	
forms	 of	 ‘gender	 based	 violence’	 –	 like	 sexual	 abuse	 and	 homophobic	 bullying	 of	 boys	 and	
transgender	youth	–	as	well	as	with	forms	of	violence	that	may	not	be	so	obviously	(or	at	least	
primarily)	about	gender	–	such	as	gang	violence	or	police	violence.		
	
The	 progressive	 potential	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 organic	 intersectionality	 in	 the	 anti‐violence	 field	 is	
twofold.	First,	it	has	direct	appeal	to	young	boys	in	poor	communities	because	they	can	see	their	
stake	 in	 working	 for	 change	 in	 their	 schools	 and	 communities.	 Second,	 it	 can	 re‐infuse	 a	
powerful	 dose	 of	 radical	 social	 justice‐oriented	 politics	 back	 into	 a	 professionalized	 anti‐
violence	 field	 that	 in	 recent	 years	 has	 seen	 a	 severe	 thinning	 of	 its	 politics,	 and	 a	 near‐
evaporation	of	 its	ability	 to	address	connections	between	gender‐based	violence	with	broader	
social	justice	issues	like	poverty,	warfare,	and	cuts	in	public	support	for	schools	and	families.	
	
Conclusion	
In	this	article	I	have	argued	that	large‐scale	changes	created	by	social	movements	and	shifts	in	
political	economy	generate	moments	of	historical	gender	formation	that	in	turn	shape,	constrain	
and	 enable	 certain	 forms	 of	 men’s	 gender	 politics.	 The	 gender	 formation	 of	 the	 1970s,	
constituted	 by	 a	 mass	 feminist	 movement	 operating	 for	 the	 most	 part	 outside	 of	 male‐
dominated	 institutions,	 created	 a	 context	 for	 the	 rise	 of	 an	 internally‐contradictory	 men’s	
liberation	 movement	 that	 soon	 split	 into	 an	 anti‐feminist	 men’s	 rights	 movement,	 and	
supportive	pro‐feminist	men’s	organizations.		
	
For	 feminism,	 and	 for	 men’s	 activism	 around	 gender	 issues,	 the	 current	 moment	 of	 gender	
formation	is	constituted	 in	part	by	three	 large	shifts	that	accelerated	 in	the	1980s	and	1990s:		
the	 professional	 institutionalization	 of	 feminism;	 the	 rise	 of	 postfeminism;	 and	 neoliberal	
transformations	in	the	political	economy.	In	the	US	and	across	western	jurisdictions,	the	radical	
possibilities	 of	 feminism	were	 largely	 eclipsed	 behind	 the	 rise	 of	 non‐profit	 and	 state‐driven	
initiatives	 that	 confront	 issues	 like	 gender‐based	 violence	 through	 a	 professionalized	 and	
marketized	public	health	model.	While	this	context	has	not	closed	off	the	possibilities	for	men’s	
anti‐feminist	backlash	–	including	vitriolic	Internet‐based	misogyny	and	efforts	to	oppose	state	
funding	 for	 ‘women’s	 issues’	 –	 I	 have	 pointed	 to	 two	 formations	 that	 might	 prove	 to	 be	 of	
greater	concern	than	overt	antifeminism.	First,	postfeminism	and	neoliberalism	create	a	context	
conducive	to	a	‘kinder‐gentler’	moderate	men’s	rights	strategy	that	skirts	analysis	of	structural	
inequalities	 in	 favor	of	a	common‐sense	celebration	of	 individual	choice	 for	women	and	men.	
This	 approach,	 if	 successful,	 will	 further	 erode	 feminist	 gains	 in	 public	 life,	 while	 affording	
already‐privileged	men	a	language	through	which	they	can	position	themselves	not	as	atavistic	
backlashers,	but	as	modern	‘new’	men	who	are	supportive	of	equal	choices	for	women	and	men,	
unfettered	by	state	policies.		
	
Second,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 moment	 of	 gender	 formation	 has	 expanded	 the	
possibilities	for	men’s	participation	as	allies	with	women	in	anti‐violence	work.	While	this	is	a	
welcome	development	 for	most	 feminists,	on	 the	one	hand,	 the	current	professionalization	of	
gender	 work	 in	 a	 context	 of	 postfeminism	 risks	 eclipsing	 the	 language	 and	 progressive	
possibilities	of	feminism,	right	at	a	time	when	men	are	moving	into	the	field.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	linkages	of	institutionalized	anti‐violence	work	with	a	growing	public	concern	with	‘at‐risk’	
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boys	and	young	men	in	poor	schools	and	communities	has	drawn	more	young	men	of	color	into	
the	 field.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 very	 social	 forces	 –	 neoliberalization	 of	 the	 economy,	
criminalization	of	poor	young	men	of	color	–	that	some	fear	might	form	the	basis	for	an	army	of	
angry	anti‐feminist	men’s	 rights	activists,	have	also	created	 the	conditions	 for	a	movement	of	
young	men	of	color	into	the	gender‐based	violence	prevention	field.	
	
This	 influx	 of	men	 of	 color	 into	 the	 anti‐violence	 field	 has	 introduced	 a	 perhaps	 unexpected	
progressive	counterforce	against	the	ways	in	which	professionalized	anti‐violence	efforts	under	
neoliberalism	 approach	 sexual	 assault	 or	 domestic	 violence	 as	 discrete,	 public	 health	 issues.	
Men	 of	 color’s	 organically	 intersectional	 understandings	 of	 violence,	 coupled	 with	 resources	
from	feminist	social	justice	research,	have	led	to	the	development	of	innovative	strategies	in	the	
field	 that	 offer	 a	 progressive	 challenge	 to	 the	 depoliticizing	 drift	 of	 conventional	
professionalized	and	marketized	anti‐violence	work.	For	the	most	part,	this	challenge	emerges	
not	in	the	 language	of	a	narrowly	professionalized	liberal	feminism,	but	packaged	instead	in	a	
broadened	‘social	justice’	framework	within	which	feminist	ideas	about	men’s	violence	against	
women	 are	 a	 central	 thread	 in	 a	 broad	 intersectional	 framework	 that	 also	 addresses	 the	
institutionalized	 violences	 of	 racism,	 poverty,	 unemployment,	 declining	 schools,	 and	 the	
criminal	justice	system.		
	
Does	 feminism	 risk	 being	 lost	 in	 the	 social	 justice	 configuration	 now	 emerging	 in	 the	
professionalized	 anti‐violence	 field?	 Do	 women’s	 concerns	 with	 sexual	 assault	 and	 domestic	
violence	risk	being	subordinated	once	again	to	men’s	concerns	about	class	and	race	issues?	Yes.	
But	the	intersectional	social	justice	framework	also	holds	the	promise	of	broadening	feminism	
beyond	the	limits	of	the	individualistic	white	professional	class	feminism	so	often	criticized	by	
feminist	women	of	 color.	And	here	 is	where	 the	 continued	 importance	and	power	of	 feminist	
professionals	 and	 institutions	 come	 into	play:	 veteran	 feminists	 can	keep	 alive	 the	 flame	of	 a	
feminism	 that	 burns	 brightly	precisely	because	 its	 politics	 remain	 ignited	by	deep	 and	multi‐
level	commitments	to	justice	efforts.		
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